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In many situations, actively engaging in metacognition may improve cognitive
achievement and subjective well-being. However, the potential disadvantages of
metacognitive engagement are only rarely communicated in metacognition research.
In this paper, I outline three ways in which metacognition may reduce cognitive
achievement and psychological well-being. First, metacognition may sometimes actively
interfere with task performance. Second, the costs of engaging in metacognitive
strategies may under certain circumstances outweigh its benefits. Third, metacognitive
judgments or feelings involving a negative self-evaluation may detract from psychological
well-being. The main contribution of this paper is to integrate findings from different
research traditions in order to illustrate the three suggested ways in which metacognition
may be unhelpful. An implication of this overview is that although metacognition is most
often beneficial to cognitive achievement and subjective well-being, one should bear
in mind that it may also have the opposite effect. It is important for researchers and
practitioners to take this potential downside of metacognition into account. Practitioners
might find it useful to consider the following three questions that relate to my
aforementioned claims: Is the nature of the task such that metacognition could interfere
with performance? Is the cognitive demand required by the metacognitive strategy
disproportionally large compared to its potential usefulness to cognitive achievement?
Does metacognition lead to an unhelpful comparison of oneself to others? The same
considerations should be kept in mind when researchers and practitioners communicate
the potential implications of research findings in metacognition research to audiences
within and beyond the research community.
Keywords: metacognition, normative, metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive strategies, introspection,
verbalization, metacognitive feelings, mindlessness–mindfulness
INTRODUCTION
Metacognition is a hot research topic. A vast number of scientific papers and
books have addressed metacognition since the concept was first introduced in the
1970s (Flavell and Wellman, 1977; Flavell, 1979), and a variety of methodological
approaches have been developed and applied within different psychological subdisciplines
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(Norman et al., 2019). Metacognition has also become
an increasingly popular term in everyday language, and
is frequently used in, for instance, educational settings
(Dimmitt and McCormick, 2012).
Researchers commonly refer to metacognition as consisting
of three facets (Flavell, 1979). Metacognitive knowledge refers
to people’s general knowledge and understanding of various
cognitive processes, and of their own versus other people’s
cognitive abilities and strategies (Efklides, 2008). Metacognitive
strategies are deliberate strategies used to control cognition
(Efklides, 2008). Metacognitive experiences are feelings,
judgments, and task-specific knowledge that reflect what
the person is aware of and feels during task performance
(Efklides, 2008).
Metacognition research often seems concerned with what
people ought or ought not to do. I first provide a tentative
description of this normative aspect of metacognition research,
suggesting that the majority of metacognition research gives
more attention to the potential benefits of metacognition than
to its potential disadvantages. Then I present examples of
specific ways in which metacognition is sometimes not beneficial
to cognitive achievement and psychological well-being. In my
opinion, these have not yet been given adequate voice in
the literature, and there have not been many attempts to
integrate examples of negative influences of metacognition from
different research traditions. This paper attempts to provide
such an integration and to thereby increase awareness of the
potential downside of metacognition. The main focus is on
metacognitive strategies, which is the facet most often associated
with a conscious choice. However, to the extent that the
three facets are interrelated (e.g., applying a metacognitive
strategy would most often require activating metacognitive




Most would agree that metacognition serves to monitor
and control ongoing cognitive activity (Nelson and Narens,
1990). Metacognition as a research topic has spread to
multiple areas of psychology, including developmental,
personality, social, clinical, and forensic psychology, to
mention a few. Thus, it has become a cross-disciplinary
subject (Koriat, 2002, 2007). Also across these subdisciplines,
the functional role of metacognition is widely agreed upon
(Norman et al., 2019).
Closely linked to this functional role is the idea of something
that the individual ought to strive for, some goal that they
should try to reach by applying metacognitive strategies or
knowledge. Two candidate outcome variables can be outlined.
One is cognitive achievement. This relates to how much the
individual learns or remembers, how well the person solves
problems, to what extent the person can make rational decisions
and reason logically, etc. Metacognition could play a role
in cognitive achievement by helping the person make use
of the best cognitive and metacognitive strategies in the
given situation.
The other category of outcome variable is psychological
well-being. Some definitions of well-being focus on happiness,
life satisfaction, and positive affect (Diener, 1984) some on
the absence of distress and dysfunction (see Joseph and
Wood, 2010 for a critical perspective), and yet others on
the balance between the individual’s challenges and resources
(Dodge et al., 2012). I suggest that metacognition could
influence well-being in at least two ways. One is through its
influence on cognitive achievement. This would happen in cases
where metacognitive activity improves cognitive achievement
and thus leads to positive experiences. For instance, applying
metacognitive strategies may help a student achieve a higher
grade, which makes the student happy. The other is through
the metacognitive activity itself being subjectively experienced
as pleasant or unpleasant, which could directly affect a
person’s current mood and well-being. For example, a strong
feeling of comprehending a text could be experienced as
positive. A contrasting feeling of low comprehension could be
experienced as negative.
METACOGNITION AS HELPFUL
In some parts of the literature, the normative ideal of increasing
metacognitive awareness is explicitly stated. For example,
educational programs inspired by metacognition literature often
encourage teachers to increase students’ metacognitive awareness
and abilities to improve learning (Siegesmund, 2016) or social
skills and psychological well-being (Umino and Dammeyer,
2016). The importance of metacognitive awareness is also
highlighted in the clinical literature on metacognitive therapy
(Wells, 2011) which assumes a role of patients’ metacognitive
awareness of dysfunctional cognitive patterns—together with
acquisition of alternative metacognitive strategies—in recovery
from mental illness. In medical decision making, Stark and Fins
(2014) have argued for medical professionals’ “ethical imperative
to thinking about thinking” in order to prevent diagnostic errors.
However, also when this is not explicitly stated, metacognition
research often seems to imply that metacognitive activity is
beneficial. Being metacognitively active could involve being
aware of metacognitive beliefs and knowledge and actively
applying metacognitive strategies. As metacognition has received
increased popularity in psychological disciplines, the impact of
this normative assumption has spread correspondingly. Even
when researchers express no opinion on whether metacognition
is useful, empirical findings are often used to argue for
its beneficial effects. This also extends beyond the research
community. For example, the term metacognition is often used
by teachers and school leaders in Norway, where children as
young as 6–7 are encouraged to apply it in their own learning
(Fleming et al., 2010; Furnes and Norman, 2016). The widely
held assumption that metacognition is beneficial, could at least
in part be understood as a consequence of its close relationship
to self-regulation (Zimmerman, 2008; Efklides, 2011). Thus, the
benefits of metacognition could be inferred from literature that
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has argued for the benefits of willpower, also in contexts beyond
education (Baumeister and Tierney, 2012).
METACOGNITION AS UNHELPFUL
There are also examples of research showing how metacognition
can sometimes be unhelpful. Because such research findings
may provide guidance as to when one should encourage or
discourage metacognitive activity, it is important that they are
communicated to both researchers and practitioners. Yet, such
findings are rarely given much weight in the metacognition
literature. One reason could be that some of this research has
not been conducted under the heading of “metacognition,” even
when clearly addressing metacognitive phenomena. Therefore,
these findings are rarely discussed cojointly. Another reason
could be that common opinion is that all in all, the potential
disadvantages of metacognition are less important because they
are normally outweighed by its advantages.
However, disadvantages of metacognition may still be
important. In the following, I therefore summarize some relevant
findings from different research areas, exemplifying ways in
which metacognition can sometimes not be helpful—or even
outright unhelpful—to cognitive achievement and psychological
well-being. The discussion will center around three suggestions,
namely, that (1) metacognition may actively interfere with
task performance, (2) the costs of engaging in metacognitive
strategies may outweigh the benefits, and that (3) metacognitive
judgments or feelings involving a negative self-evaluation may
detract from psychological well-being1. I address all three facets
of metacognition.
Metacognition May Actively Interfere
With Task Performance
I some situations, certain forms of metacognition may actively
interfere with task performance.
One example is concurrent verbalization of metacognitive
experiences. There is empirical evidence to show that
concurrent explanations of metacognitive experiences can
impair performance, at least when it comes to experience-based,
“intuitive” feelings. In a series of findings by Schooler et al.
(1993, 1997), the negative effect of verbalization on cognitive task
performance is commonly referred to as “verbal overshadowing”
(see also Yamada, 2009). Verbal overshadowing has been
explained in terms of a discrepancy between verbal labels and
properties of the perceptual experience, a processing shift from
global to local processing, and a criterion shift toward more
conservative responding (Chin and Schooler, 2008). In contrast,
others have demonstrated that verbalization in some situations
can be helpful and improve performance (Leisti et al., 2014). Of
course not all verbalizations involve metacognition. These are
limited to those instances where the person attempts to verbalize
some aspect of a cognitive process or its outcome. Examples
1I would like to thank a reviewer for suggesting this way of structuring my
arguments.
include descriptions of sensory experiences, problem solving,
and subjective preferences.
A different line of arguments suggesting that attention to
metacognitive experiences is not always beneficial, comes from
research on mindlessness (Neal et al., 2011). Simply defined,
mindlessness is the opposite or absence of mindfulness. Langer
(1992) defines mindlessness as lack of attention or presence,
resulting in or caused by automatic application of existing
knowledge. Thus, it is characterized by cognitive inflexibility. Di
Nucci (2013) describes mindlessness as being characterized by
automated and unconscious processing, or what we associate
with “System 1” thinking, i.e., fast, automatic/uncontrollable,
effortless, associative, implicit, and emotionally charged thinking
(Kahneman, 2003). Whereas some regard mindlessness as a state
that should be avoided (Langer, 1992) others have argued that
mindlessness may at times be beneficial (Di Nucci, 2013; Kashdan
and Biswas-Diener, 2014). For instance, complex decisions
that largely involve implicit/unconscious knowledge may best
be made mindlessly. Mindfulness can be seen as a form of
metacognition (Shapiro et al., 2006; Jankowski and Holas, 2014).
Thus, in the same way that mindlessness can sometimes be
beneficial, the choice to not execute a metacognitive strategy or
to ignore a metacognitive experience could sometimes benefit
cognitive performance.
A third example is overconfidence. Studies of the Dunnig–
Kruger effect (Kruger and Dunning, 1999) have shown that
people whose performance falls within the lower quartile on
various laboratory and real-world tasks, tend to overestimate
their performance relative to people who perform better. This
has been referred to as a “double curse” (Dunning, 2011)
because it appears that the same shortcomings responsible for
low performance also prevents low-performing individuals from
recognizing that they are making errors. It could be argued that
in cases where learning and improvement are unlikely to occur,
overconfidence may be beneficial to the person’s self-image and
mood. However, this may not represent the whole truth. Even
when learning is unlikely, there may be potential downsides to
overconfidence. For example, someone who overestimates their
abilities may invest their cognitive resources in a non-optimal
fashion. Moreover, unrealistically high expectations of oneself
that are not fulfilled may cause distress2. Thus, it is not difficult to
imagine potential negative long-term effects of overconfidence.
The Costs of Engaging in Metacognitive
Strategies May Outweigh the Benefits
Metacognitive strategies are people’s deliberate attempts to
control cognition by applying various learned skills. For instance,
adequate reading comprehension may require being able to adapt
one’s reading speed to the complexity of the text, and to go
back and repeat difficult words or sentences if comprehension
is low. Metacognitive strategies are generally seen as important
both in student learning and in other cognitively demanding
situations. In clinical psychology, metacognitive strategies refer
to the monitoring and control of thoughts related to a mental
disorder. This includes both learned, unhealthy thought patterns
2I would like to thank a reviewer for raising this point.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 July 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 1537
fpsyg-11-01537 July 2, 2020 Time: 14:3 # 4
Norman Metacognition
that contribute to the problem, and learned behaviors used
to break those patterns. Imagine a patient with generalized
anxiety. Certain metacognitive strategies could contribute to this
condition. These include the constant monitoring of thoughts
and threats, thought suppression, and checking behavior.
Therapeutic metacognitive strategies might include keeping track
of the time is spent on compulsive checking, and prioritizing and
planning ahead without rigidity (Sudhir et al., 2017).
The aforementioned cases of verbalization and mindlessness
exemplify how the specific costs of engaging in particular
forms of metacognitive strategies in specific cases may outweigh
its benefits. Additionally, engaging in metacognitive strategies
may come at a more general cost: The intentional application
of a metacognitive strategy could be demanding in terms of
time and cognitive resources. Metacognitive strategies must
be learned, either through explicit instruction or implicitly
through everyday experiences. This is the case both for those
strategies that address purely cognitive tasks like reading or
problem solving, and for strategies aimed at improving mental
health. Although a strategy can become largely automatized with
extended practice, the implementation of most strategies is likely
to require some degree of initiative or effort. In many cases,
applying metacognitive strategies may obviously be helpful and
improve cognitive performance and/or well-being. However, in
cases where it is not so, going ahead with a cognitive task
without employing an effortful metacognitive strategy could
lead to higher subjective well-being simply because it would be
less straining/demanding. For example, if reading a novel was
part of a student’s course requirement in English, a conscious
strategy to monitor one’s comprehension during reading is
unlikely to increase comprehension, but could very well reduce
well-being. In such cases, it could be argued that encouraging
people to acquire and use metacognitive strategies would not
always be helpful.
The idea that the cost of engaging in metacognitive strategies
may outweigh its benefits has some parallels to the concept of
bounded rationality in decision making (Simon, 1957).
Metacognitive Judgments or Feelings
Involving a Negative Self-Evaluation May
Detract From Psychological Well-Being
Metacognitive beliefs (i.e., a form of metacognitive knowledge)
may address a person’s evaluation of their own abilities and self-
worth (Tarricone, 2011). For instance, a person may—correctly
or incorrectly—assume that they are less able/talented than other
people when it comes to some cognitive ability. This could in
turn lower the person’s self-esteem and self-efficacy and thereby
reduce their efforts in and motivation for trying to do their
best on a certain cognitive task. Believing that others are more
gifted or able than oneself in a certain area could have a similar
effect. Metacognitive beliefs could also take the form of ideas
about how one should ideally be or behave. For example, a high
school student could mistakenly believe that one should ideally
learn all central definitions of a certain subject by heart. To the
extent that such beliefs represent distorted or exaggerated views
of reality, they may hinder successful adaptation. This might in
principle impair both cognitive achievement and psychological
well-being. For example, the mistaken belief of the student in
our previous example may increase stress and reduce motivation,




I started off by suggesting that metacognition research has
a normative side. Empirical and theoretical research on
metacognition often seems to imply that metacognitive
sensitivity, metacognitive awareness, and the active use of
metacognitive knowledge and strategies are helpful and
something we should strive for. In the paper I have attempted
to show that this may not always be the case. I have given some
brief examples of times when metacognition may hinder rather
than facilitate performance, and reduce rather than increase
psychological well-being. I have outlined some preliminary
hypotheses. The analysis is tentative and needs to be followed
up by empirical studies, although some already have empirical
support. To date, claims (1) and (2) have more empirical
support than claim (3).
Importantly, I am not trying to argue that people can
always choose whether or not to “be metacognitive” in
a given situation. Each facet of metacognition could in
principle be activated automatically or voluntarily. For instance,
metacognitive knowledge of ourselves (e.g., “I’m useless at
quizzes”) can be activated involuntarily. At the same time, we
can intentionally choose to retrieve and reflect upon the same
knowledge. Similarly, even though a metacognitive experience
(of, e.g., confidence) can sometimes occur regardless of one’s
conscious intent, we can to a certain extent choose to attend
to or ignore such experiences. The application of metacognitive
strategies (e.g., to pay attention to how well you understand
a text), could be seen as resulting from a conscious intention.
However, the application of a metacognitive strategy (e.g., to
read slower if comprehension is low) could also be largely
automatic. Thus, the voluntary nature of metacognition primarily
relates to the activation of metacognitive knowledge, the decision
to attend to one’s metacognitive feelings, and the intentional
use of metacognitive strategies. It should also be noted that
some of my examples concern what may be labeled “good”
metacognition whereas others concern “bad” metacognition (i.e.,
false metacognitive conclusions).
My examples are taken from research on normally functioning
individuals. However, there are also some obvious clinical
implications. Well-being can, for example, be affected in cases
where a person is too sensitive to metacognitive feelings.
One such example is obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD).
According to Coles et al. (2003), OCD is characterized by an
increased tendency to experience and attend to “not just right”
experiences. Thus, being metacognitively sensitive might be
beneficial, but in some contexts only up to a certain point. As
pointed out by Janeck et al. (2003), the tendency to engage in
excessive amounts of metacognitive self-reflection “may increase
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opportunities for negative appraisals of intrusive thoughts, foster
over-importance of thought beliefs, and increase the likelihood of
developing OCD” (ibid., p. 181).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Metacognition is a normal part of cognitive functioning. We
cannot choose to “be metacognitive” or not. However, we
can choose whether to apply certain metacognitive strategies,
attend to metacognitive feelings, or reflect upon metacognitive
knowledge. In various clinical and educational settings, this
is often encouraged (Wells, 2011; Siegesmund, 2016; Umino
and Dammeyer, 2016). Here, metacognition implies something
more than experiencing naturally occurring metacognitive
activity. An increased focus on metacognition could perhaps
be seen as related to the more general therapeutic self-help
culture (Madsen, 2015) and my claims consistent with critical
perspectives to this trend.
I have shown that metacognition can be unhelpful in at least
three ways. Correspondingly, before encouraging someone to
engage in metacognition, it is relevant to consider the following
three questions: Is the nature of the task such that metacognition
could interfere with performance? Is the cognitive demand
required by the metacognitive strategy disproportionally large
compared to its potential usefulness to cognitive achievement?
Does metacognition lead to an unhelpful comparison of oneself
to others? If the answer to any of these is yes, metacognition
might be more unhelpful than helpful.
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